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Labor market conditions are known to be an important factor for determining crime rates. 
This is why policy makers suggest increasing the minimum wage can help reduce crime. The 
argument is based on the assumption that raising the minimum wage will not have undue 
negative employment effects and result in improving the legitimate labor market by enticing 
those who would commit crimes to enter the legitimate labor market. Using a cross-section of the 
50 states, this study examines overall youth property crime and overall youth violent crime from 
the 2000-2016 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) to determine what effect there is from a state 
setting their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. I additionally examine the 
individual categories of youth property crime and youth violent crime to see if they behave 
similarly to the overall indices. My models use fixed effects panel estimation. There is a 
statistically significant negative effect from a state setting their minimum wage above the federal 
minimum wage on overall property crime and three of its categories. One category of property 
crime and one category of violent crime show a statistically significant positive effect from a 
state setting their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. Overall violent crime and 
three of its categories do not show a statistically significant effect from a state setting their 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Crime is an ever-present aspect of society that has existed for as long as humans have. 
From Ancient Rome to Native American tribes, groups have established rules to govern the 
social order and people have broken those rules. Modern politicians, just like those who 
governed before them, are faced with this constant issue. 
There is no single factor that determines crime rates. They are subject to a wide array of 
factors, which means that policy makers can take a number of actions towards reducing the 
amount of crime. More obvious measures are those that seek to directly control crime. Increasing 
incarceration or the number of police have both shown to be effective measures for reducing 
crime rates (Levitt, 2004). Unfortunately, there is a glaring issue with implementing such policy. 
Police and prisons are quite expensive and impose serious budgeting constraints. For instance, in 
2012 the average cost of housing a single inmate in the United States was over $29,000 a year 
(Kearney et al., 2014). Increasing the number of inmates housed by any significant amount is 
quite a burden to pass on to taxpayers. 
Direct crime control measures are not the only measures to have a known impact on 
crime. Education also shows to have a relationship with crime rates, and thus can be a viable 
policy option for reducing crime. Machin and Meghir (2004) find that educational attainment has 
a negative relationship with crime rates. Education though, as with direct crime control 




With a mind towards maintaining balanced budgets, policy makers have grown fond of 
suggesting policies that impact labor market conditions as measures that can aid in crime 
reduction. This is because there is a known relationship between labor market conditions and 
criminal behavior. Mustard (2010) finds that people’s propensity to engage in criminal activity is 
negatively related to employment opportunity. It is also known that a negative relationship exists 
between wages and crime rates (Gould et al., 2002). This is why policy that impacts the labor 
market is enticing to policy makers. 
One policy measure that affects labor market conditions and has very little implications 
for budgeting is minimum wage policy. Already this policy is quite popular amongst politicians, 
partially because of its impact on criminal activity. In recent years many states and cities have 
raised their minimum wage to the point that over half of the states now have minimum wages 
higher than the federal minimum wage. Many of the politicians that have pushed for these 
increased minimum wages have espoused that the increase will help alleviate crime. The logic 
behind this is due to the fact that the minimum wage has the greatest impact on youth and 
unskilled workers, the two groups most likely to commit crimes. 
The issue with using the crime reduction argument as a reason to increase the minimum 
wage is that economic theory alone has trouble telling us how the minimum wage will shift 
crime rates. This is because the minimum wage is known to have two effects when it comes to 
impacting crime. One effect is the unemployment effect, which relates to labor demand. When 
the minimum wage is increased, the cost for unskilled labor rises for firms. This leads to less 




hours worked. These workers lose income and consequently have more time and economic need 
to commit crimes. The other effect is the wage effect. As the minimum wage rises, income rises 
for those people that are legitimately employed. This rise in income for legitimate employment 
will cause some people who weren’t participating in the legitimate labor market to seek entry 
into it. It also makes it less likely that those who were already working will seek to engage in 
criminal activity. These two effects act in opposition to each other, and this is why it is difficult 
for economic theory to tell us what effect the minimum wage has on crime rates. 
I examine youths aged 16 to 24 across a cross section of the 50 states over the years 2000 
through 2016 to examine the direct effect of the minimum wage on the youth violent crime 
index, youth property crime index and the individual crime categories that make up the two 
indices. My crime data represents total youth arrests per year per 100,000 population. I classify 
the states based on whether they use the federal minimum wage, which is currently $7.25 an 
hour, or a higher minimum wage to determine what impact there is on crime from a state setting 
their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. The results show that youth property 
crime experiences the greatest impact from changing the minimum wage. The youth property 
crime index and three of its categories experience a measurable decrease from a state setting 
their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. For these types of crime, the wage effect 
appears stronger than the unemployment effect. One type of youth property crime and one type 
of youth violent crime experience a measurable increase from a state setting their minimum wage 
above the federal minimum wage. For these types of crime, the unemployment effect appears 
stronger than the wage effect. The study does not show minimum wage having any effect on the 




Chapter 2 of my paper provides a discussion of existing research on the various factors 
that are known to impact crime rates and the two effects that minimum wage has on crime. I then 
describe how my research adds to the existing research on the topic of minimum wage and 
crime. In Chapter 3 I present the full theoretical model of how minimum wage impacts crime 
rates. I also provide a discussion of the data used in my study, what hypotheses I will be testing 
and the full details of my empirical regression model. Chapter 4 is a presentation and discussion 
of the full results obtained from my regression model. I conclude the paper with Chapter 5 by 
briefly discussing my results with respect to policy and offer suggestions for how future research 
can build on my study. After the paper I include an appendix which shows the results of my 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Crime rates are a result of an amalgamation of many factors. There is not a single cause 
that can be readily identified as to why crime rates vary across regions and throughout time. 
Also, what might be an important factor in determining crime rates in one particular region may 
not show to be an important factor in determining crime rates in a different region. This means 
that a number of policies can play a role in how crime rates change, and that policies might need 
to be tailored to specific locales in order to truly have an effect on crime rates. For these reasons, 
researchers looking into crime have looked at many different things to help policy makers 
determine the potential impacts of their decisions. 
While there might be many factors at play when it comes to the crime rates in an area at a 
given time, the one factor that is always present is people. People create their desired social order 
and it is people who violate the social order through criminal activity. Because people are the 
most important factor for crime, it is very important to consider demographics when examining 
crime. For example, Heiskanen and Lietonen (2016) examine gender and crime across the globe 
and find that in all regions of the world, the rate of male suspects is significantly higher than the 
rate of female suspects. Despite inconsistent reporting across the globe, this result holds for 
every region they examine in their research. Men consistently show to be suspects at nearly three 
times the rate of women no matter what part of the globe is being examined. This indicates that 
regions with higher proportions of males in the population are more likely to experience higher 
crime rates. This marks gender as an important demographic factor to consider when examining 




A review of crime statistics in the United States finds that racial minorities commit violent 
crimes at a higher rate (Rosich, 2007). The finding is a bit misleading though, because the review 
also finds there is a disproportionate representation of minorities in the criminal justice system. 
This makes the rate appear even greater than it should, but despite this skew there is still clear 
evidence to support the finding that minorities do commit violent crimes at a higher rate than 
whites in the United States. These studies show that crime rates are partially determined by who 
makes up a population. 
Because demographics are known to have an impact on crime rates, some studies have 
looked at the impact of foreign-born population. Research on how the number of foreign-born 
people impacts crime rates by Cerulli et al. (2018) finds that when the number of foreign-born 
make up less than 20 percent of a population there is minimal impact on crime rates in an area. 
When the proportion of foreign-born people crosses 20 percent though, then there is a noticeable 
rise in crime rates. The research also finds that integration does not seem to play a factor in this 
effect. Evidence suggests that foreign-born population being economically disadvantaged is the 
cause of the rise in crime rates. Still, this signifies that immigration policy can have a legitimate 
effect on crime rates. Policy makers can tailor their immigration policy with the aim of keeping 
the percentage of foreign-born population below the crime increasing level. They could also 
tailor policy to mitigate the economic disadvantages. 
Most policy implemented for reducing crime rates aims to influence the behavior of the 
population. This is because there are many policy areas available which influence behaviors 




Other policies serve to entice positive behavioral outcomes, typically by directly improving a 
person's economic situation or improving labor market conditions. 
 Naturally, when people think about crime they also think about police. Police are 
employed with the specific purpose of maintaining the social order, and they do that primarily by 
combating criminal activity. The role that police have in society has made researchers seek out 
how crime rates are influenced by police. Wilson and Boland (1978) find that both the amount of 
resources devoted to policing and policing strategies both play a role in how effective police are 
at reducing crime. They note that the effectiveness of police varies greatly depending on the type 
of crime. Visible crimes such as robbery are more noticeably impacted by police than are 
stealthier crimes such as burglary. They surmise that the reason for this is because stealthier 
crimes lack witnesses and evidence, making it more difficult for police to pursue offenders. The 
effect that police have on crime is known as deterrence theory, and it makes sense that the effect 
is greater for crimes where the offender is not making as much of an effort to remain hidden. 
Deterrence theory is not a new notion, but one that has been around for centuries. Early scholars 
such as Beccaria and Voltaire (1872) are known to have mentioned deterrence theory. While it 
has been known for a long time that police have an effect on crime rates, more recent efforts 
have focused on quantifying that effect in a measurable way. Chalfin and McCrary (2013) 
measure the resources spent on police and find that in 2010 a single dollar spent on policing 
returns $1.60 in social welfare value. The societal benefit of this allocation of resources is not 
consistent though. They note that the crime reduction benefit in spending on police is much 
greater for violent crime than it is for property crime. There is still a noticeable benefit in terms 




deterring criminal activity, it is important to note that the effect varies based on the type of 
criminal activity. It is still important to account for police though, no matter the type of crime 
being examined. 
 Police are one of the most visible deterrents against criminal behavior, but they are not 
the only deterrent that has shown to be effective in reducing criminal activity. There is evidence 
that incarceration is also an effective policy measure for reducing crime rates. Levitt (2004) finds 
that crime reductions in the 1990s were at least partially attributable to incarceration. The 
increases in incarceration during this period were responsible for an approximately twelve 
percent decline in violent crime and an eight percent decline in property crime. This decline is 
attributed to the deterrent effect of incarceration. As with policing though, there seems to be 
some variance in the impact of incarceration on crime rates. Research into prison cycling, the act 
of removing offenders from society and then replacing them after their incarceration, suggests 
that the region being discussed is an important factor (Clear et al., 2014). In this study, some 
regions experienced an increase in criminal activity when a person was removed to prison from 
society while other regions experienced a decline in criminal activity when a person was 
removed to prison from society. They determine that there is additional societal response beyond 
the individual criminal, and that response is not consistent in all regions. Another factor that has 
been considered with incarceration is scale. Liedka, Piehl and Useem (2006) note the 
effectiveness of prisons in reducing crime, but that the effectiveness depends on the size of the 
prison. They find decreasing returns to scale and the decrease in returns accelerates rapidly the 




an expensive endeavor, and it makes sense that policy makers seek out alternative measures for 
crime reduction. 
 There are means of reducing criminal behavior beyond implementing deterrent measures. 
Policies that encourage positive behavior have also shown to be effective. One policy area that 
has this sought-after positive effect is education policy. Witte and Tauchen (1994) examine 
young men and find that participation in school is associated with a reduction in criminal 
activity. They attribute this reduction to the fact that being engaged in school occupies the young 
men’s time thus reducing the opportunity they have to commit crimes. This finding suggests that 
other similar legitimate activities should have a similar crime reducing effect through time 
occupation if they were provided. 
 Education’s crime reducing effect goes beyond its ability to legitimately occupy a 
potential perpetrator’s time. This is because education also plays a role in how a person engages 
with the labor market. Gould et al. (2002) determine that wages are a significant factor in the 
reason people choose to commit crimes. Machin et al. (2011) demonstrate that higher 
educational attainment is associated with earning higher incomes and thus has a crime reducing 
effect. As people become more skilled, they are able to demand a better wage. In terms of policy, 
there are other benefits to educational attainment. Mincer (1991) notes that there is an overall 
lesser incidence of unemployment for those who have attained higher levels of education. Higher 
unemployment is associated with higher crime rates, and by reducing unemployment education 
combats this effect. Education reduces the chances that people will experience economic distress. 




 While the overall effect of higher educational attainment is to decrease crime, there are 
instances where a person’s education might increase criminal activity. Levitt and Lochner (2001) 
note that certain disciplines provide the skills and knowledge necessary to improve a person’s 
chances at being successful in criminal endeavors. They note that this may lead to an increase in 
certain crimes because the criminal act is more rewarding. If people are not sufficiently rewarded 
for their education in the legitimate labor market, then they are more likely to be enticed to 
commit crime. 
 Beyond the chance that some disciplines might increase crime, there is another issue with 
education. Education, as with police and prisons, is a costly endeavor. From models based on the 
school years 1998-1999 through 2001-2002, Gronberg et al. (2004) estimate that at the mean an 
additional high school student costs $3,726 in the state of Texas. They note that if you seek to 
improve the outcome of students, such as by increasing the passing rate, then the cost per student 
will increase accordingly. Fortunately, like with police, there is an increased return from the 
money spent on education. Hanushek and Wößmann (2010) find that education improves the 
skill of workers and that skill improvement has a positive impact on economic growth. There is a 
noticeable societal payoff from education, one that should lead to increased demand for labor. 
Education has serious budgetary implications, but its role in the labor market has positive 
economic benefits. 
 Noting that part of the reason education impacts crime rates is because it reduces the 
chances of becoming unemployed, it makes sense to examine the relationship unemployment has 




unemployment and crime rates. This relationship is at least in part attributable to an unemployed 
person lacking income. This lack of income from being unemployed can be addressed through 
unemployment insurance policies, which in turn impacts crime rates. Petroulakis (2017) 
examines the United States during the great recession and notes that crime rates actually were 
falling during this period despite extremely high unemployment. He finds that unemployment 
insurance was a large part of why crime fell when unemployment was high. More specifically, 
the unemployment insurance benefit extensions blunted the effect that prolonged unemployment 
would typically have on crime rates. This also shows that social welfare policies can play an 
important role in determining crime rates. Social welfare policies act to negate other factors that 
would normally lead to increases in criminal activity. 
 Education’s other crime reduction benefit has to do with income. When examining the 
relationship between income and crime rates, it has been found that a person’s direct income is 
not the only factor in determining crime rates. Income inequality also appears to play an 
important role in crime rates. İmrohoroĝlu et al. (2006) note that income inequality appears to be 
one of the more important variables in determining crime rates. Because the disparity between 
low earners and high earners is important, other researchers have sought to explain the reason for 
the significance. Kelly (2000) suggests that the effect of income inequality serves to juxtapose 
the low returns of legitimate labor activities with the high wealth of others. Lower income 
earners appear to be more enticed by the potential payoff in crime when those around them have 
a disproportionately larger amount of wealth. One potential explanation for this is strain theory 
(Merton, 1938). The theory states that poorer individuals engage in crime because they are 




standpoint. Perceived social exclusion triggers psychological responses according to Leary 
(1990). Wealth is an excluding factor for many goods and services. Low income can act as a 
catalyst for increasing crime rates when income inequality is high, especially when exclusion 
based on income is visible. 
 Research has consistently shown that labor market conditions are an important factor in 
crime. One policy that impacts labor market conditions in a number of ways is the minimum 
wage. Minimum wage is known to have an effect on income, income inequality and 
unemployment. These three things are all known to have a direct impact on crime rates. 
 Because minimum wage can increase the income of low wage earners, it has the potential 
to reduce income inequality. Litwin (2015) demonstrates that the minimum wage does indeed 
reduce income inequality. This study shows there is a maximizing level for this reduction. 
Minimum wages above that level actually begin to reverse the reduction in income inequality. 
There is probably some reduction in crime rates due to this effect, but research measuring this 
impact of minimum wage has not sought what effect it has on crime. 
 Most research into minimum wage and crime rates focuses on the areas that are most 
easily measured, income and unemployment. Minimum wage is known to directly impact both of 
these labor market factors, and in turn these two factors are known to impact crime rates. It is 
important to understand how these two factors impact crime rates to understand how minimum 




Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors released a report in April of 2016 that said 
increasing the federal minimum wage to $12 an hour would result in a 3 to 5 percent reduction in 
criminal activity (“Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System,” 
2016). These findings are in line with a number of economic studies on the matter, and based on 
one study in particular. It was found that between 1980 and 1994, criminal activity experienced 
an increase partly because of decreasing wages among unskilled labor (Gould et al., 2002). This 
study showed that the measurable wage decline led to a dramatic increase in both property crime 
and violent crime. The study did show that unemployment during this period also had an effect, 
but the effect was much smaller than that of wages. This study can be considered an extension of 
previous research that sought to explain the link between labor market conditions and crime 
rates. Freeman (1982) finds an almost inconclusive relationship between unemployment and 
crime rates. The study shows that there is a relationship, but has trouble quantifying that 
relationship. Freeman finds that crime rates have a stronger association to the wages of unskilled 
workers. Increasing the wages of unskilled workers leads to a noticeable decrease in crime rates. 
Grogger (1997) notes that one reason blacks are more likely to commit crimes than whites in the 
United States is because they typically earn less than whites. This study suggests that wages can 
be used to reduce the economic disadvantages of blacks and thus reduce the disparity in the 
crime rates of blacks and whites in the United States. Studies like these that indicate wage has a 
strong effect on crime rates are why policy makers tout using the minimum wage as a tool for 
crime reduction. 
It is important to remember that minimum wage does not just impact the wages of 




there are researchers who examine the specific impact that raising the minimum wage has on 
employment levels. The goal of these studies is to isolate the role that the minimum wage plays 
in the unskilled labor supply and demand model. One study finds that increasing the minimum 
wage does not have a noticeable impact on the available employment for unskilled labor (Cengiz 
et al., 2019). This study examines Washington state because of its long record of state level 
minimum wage increases. It is noted that the available employment opportunities were not 
unduly affected by these repeated increases in the minimum wage throughout the years. Godøy 
and Reich (2019) examine lower wage areas across the entire United States to determine what 
impact increasing the effective minimum wage has on employment. They note that there is no 
noticeable decrease in employment opportunities for unskilled labor, even in states with lower 
wages in general such as Alabama and Mississippi. The research does indicate that poverty 
levels decrease noticeably as the effective minimum wage increases. Because the minimum wage 
does not appear to decrease employment in a noticeable fashion, the wage effect is likely 
stronger than the unemployment effect. 
Studies that find the unemployment effect is either negligible or outweighed by the wage 
effect entirely are countered by other research showing that crime rates increase when minimum 
wage increases. Braun (2019) examines the minimum wage in the context of the crime 
minimizing wage floor and welfare maximizing wage floor. The current federal minimum wage 
is actually below the welfare maximizing wage floor, but near the crime minimizing wage floor. 
The study notes that raising the minimum wage will increase societal welfare and crime rates 
will increase simultaneously. There is an argument presented for raising the minimum wage at 




increase. This is not the only research to find crime rates increasing when minimum wage is 
increased. Fone et al. (2019) also find that increasing the minimum wage has the potential to 
increase crime. The study notes that a modest increase in the federal minimum wage would have 
little impact on crime rates in the United States. A more dramatic increase, such as that proposed 
by the Obama administration, would result in a significant jump in property crime rates. These 
findings indicate the federal minimum wage is very likely near the crime reducing level. 
Minimum wage does not directly impact crime. Rather it impacts labor market conditions 
which in turn impact crime. This is part of the reason that there is not definitive consensus about 
how crime rates respond to changes in the minimum wage. That is not to say there is no 
consensus at all with regards to minimum wage and crime. The minimum wage demonstrates it 
has a noticeably stronger effect on property crime rates than it does on violent crime rates (Gould 
et al., 2002). This finding is the same for researchers who obtained different results regarding the 
unemployment effect and wage effect. Fone et al. (2019) note that violent crime rates are not as 
responsive to the minimum wage as property crime rates. Economic factors are more likely to 
influence whether a person commits a property crime than whether they commit a violent crime. 
This is because violent crimes are less likely to result in economic gain for a person than 
property crimes. 
My research contributes to the topic of how the minimum wage impacts crime by 
examining how the minimum wage directly impacts violent crime rates, property crime rates and 
their respective categories. This study will focus on youths aged 16 to 24 in order to better isolate 




wage because they have not had the chance to develop skills and tenure that would allow them to 
demand higher wages. I use data that represents a cross section of states across the years 2000 
through 2016. Rather than using the minimum wage itself in my analysis, I classify states based 
on those that set their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage and those that simply 
use the federal minimum wage. Based on this classification, I aim to determine what effect there 
is on crime from a state setting their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. I will 





Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
In order to fully understand the theory behind how minimum wage impacts crime rates, it 
is necessary to understand the role that minimum wage plays in labor market conditions. 
Specifically, minimum wage affects the unskilled labor supply and demand model by acting as a 
price floor for unskilled labor. Firms cannot legally pay less than minimum wage and individuals 
are guaranteed to be paid at least minimum wage. The two effects that minimum wage is known 
to have on crime rates derives from this action on the unskilled labor supply and demand curves. 
One of the effects is aptly named the wage effect. This effect is caused by the minimum 
wage’s action on the unskilled labor supply curve. As the price paid for unskilled labor increases, 
more people will seek entry into the legitimate labor market. Additionally, people participating 
in the legitimate labor market will earn more for their hours worked. This effect is known to have 
a negative relationship with crime rates. As people earn higher wages, they have less need or 
want to engage in criminal activity. 
 The other effect of minimum wage acts in opposition to the wage effect and is known to 
have a positive relationship with crime rates. This effect is known as the unemployment effect. 
As minimum wage is increased, the price paid for unskilled labor by firms increases. This 
increase causes firms to demand less unskilled labor resulting in the hiring of fewer workers or 
reductions in worker hours. This results in people having a greater need or want to engage in 




 The full theory shows the two effects that minimum wage is known to have on the labor 
market. It is through these two effects on the labor market that minimum wage impacts crime 
rates. Figure 3.1 below shows the relationships of the full theory in a flow chart. 
Figure 3.1 
Flow Chart Demonstrating the Economic Theory 
 
Understanding the role of the two effects at play is the key to building the full structural 
model showing how minimum wage affects crime rates. The relationship between minimum 
wage and crime rates means that the full structural model requires three equations. Because there 
are three equations in the full structural model, there are at least three endogenous variables. 
Income represents one endogenous variable and is the dependent variable in the first equation. 
This equation accounts for the wage effect. Unemployment is another endogenous variable and is 
the dependent variable in the second equation. This equation accounts for the unemployment 




dependent variable in the third equation. This third equation utilizes Income and Unemployment 
as explanatory variables. 
Income = f (minimum wage, working hours, taxes, other socioeconomic variables) 
Unemployment = f (minimum wage, overall economy, additional labor costs, other 
socioeconomic variables) 
Crime = f (unemployment, income, crime control factors, other available opportunities, 
other socioeconomic variables) 
 Since unemployment and income are endogenous variables in the crime model, the 
equation cannot be directly estimated. Substituting the components of the income and 
unemployment equations directly into the crime equation results in the reduced form model, 
which is a function of purely exogenous factors. The reduced form model allows for testing the 
direct impact of minimum wage on crime. 
Crime = f (minimum wage, other socioeconomic variables) 
 To construct an estimated regression model based on the reduced form equation, I use 
data representing a cross section of the 50 states over the course of the years 2000 through 2016. 
Rather than use the individual minimum wage rates for each state, I classify states based on 
whether they use the federal minimum wage or have set a higher minimum wage. This allows me 
to understand the impact of a state setting their minimum wage above the federal minimum 




to committing crimes. For this reason, I focus my examination on youths aged 16 to 24 since this 
group is more likely to be subject to the minimum wage and more likely to commit crimes. My 
crime data comes from the FBI Uniform Crime Report arrest data, which tracks 29 individual 
categories and three indices. The crime data is expressed as a rate of number of arrests per year 
per 100,000 population. Rather than examine all three indices and every category of crime the 
FBI tracks, I focus on property crime and violent crime. I provide in-depth analysis of my 
estimated results for the two indices and see if their respective categories have similar estimation 
results using this model. The categories of property crime are burglary, larceny-theft, motor 
vehicle theft and arson. The categories of violent crime are murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, rape, robbery and aggravated assault. The results of my estimated regression for 
the total crime index and other categories tracked by the FBI are provided in the appendix for the 
sake of comparison. 
By splitting the states into two groups based on whether they use the federal minimum 
wage or have set a higher minimum wage, it is possible to run a comparison of means test on the 
different types of crimes. It is necessary to note that this test only accounts for the difference in 
the minimum wage between the two groups of states and not any other factors which would also 
impact crime rates. 
The comparison of means test based on whether a state uses the federal minimum wage 
or has set a higher minimum wage provides mixed results. Table 3.1 on page 28 shows the 
results of this test being applied to property crime and its categories and Table 3.2 on page 29 




overall property crime in Table 3.1 show that states who use the federal minimum wage 
experience a mean of 183.00 arrests per year per 100,000 population while states who have set a 
higher minimum wage experience a mean of 177.20, but the p-value of 0.2339 suggests that this 
finding is not significant at even the 0.15 level. This suggests that states who use the federal 
minimum wage experience similar levels of property crime as states who have set a higher 
minimum wage. The results for overall violent crime in Table 3.2 show that states who use the 
federal minimum wage experience a mean of 43.74 arrests per year per 100,000 population while 
states who have set a higher minimum wage experience a mean of 50.37, and the p-value of 
0.0002 suggests this finding is significant at the 0.01 level. In Table 3.1 the results of the test for 
youth larceny-theft show states who use the federal minimum wage experience a mean of 139.00 
arrests per year per 100,000 population while states who have set a higher minimum wage 
experience a mean of 131.50, and the p-value of 0.0485 suggests this finding is significant above 
the 0.05 level. Which group of states experiences higher crime rates depends on what category of 
crime is being discussed. The two groups experience similar rates of property crime and 
burglary. States who use the federal minimum wage experience higher rates of larceny-theft and 
murder and non-negligent manslaughter. States who have set their minimum wage above the 
federal minimum wage experience higher rates of motor vehicle theft, arson, violent crime, rape, 







Comparison of Means Based on State Minimum Wage for Youth Property Crimes 
 Property Crime Index N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
183.00 552 -1.19 0.2339 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
177.20 298   
 Burglary N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
029.81 552 -0.20 0.8434 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
030.03 298   
 Larceny-Theft N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
139.00 552 -1.98 0.0485 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
131.50 298   
 Motor Vehicle Theft N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
011.04 552 -2.04 0.0422 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
012.35 298   
 Arson N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
01.14 552 -1.70 0.0889 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
01.24 298   









Comparison of Means Based on State Minimum Wage for Youth Violent Crimes 
 Violent Crime Index N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
43.74 552 -3.74 0.0002 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 




N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
01.42 552 -4.87 <0.0001 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
01.14 298   
 Rape N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
02.19 552 -3.94 <0.0001 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
02.50 298   
 Robbery N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
11.55 552 -4.06 <0.0001 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
13.93 298   
 Aggravated Assault N t Stat P Value 
State Uses Federal Minimum 
Wage 
28.56 552 -3.13 0.0018 
State Minimum Wage Set Above 
Federal Minimum Wage 
32.48 298   
Note. Figures represent youth arrest rate per 100,000 population. 
While this classification of states based on their minimum wage is key for this research, 
the comparison of means test does not provide a complete picture of crime rates in the United 
States. There are many different factors known to influence crime. Demographics are an 
important determinant of crime, particularly because it is known that males commit crimes at 




makers implement them for this express purpose. Education is known to influence crime in 
multiple ways. It serves as a substitute activity to crime and improves a person’s position in the 
labor market. Economic factors are also important determinants of crime rates and one way that 
policy makers influence economic factors is through social welfare policy. In some instances, 
social welfare policy is implemented to change the very definition of what constitutes a crime. 
The estimated regression model used in this study is based on the reduced form 
theoretical model, which measures the direct impact of the minimum wage on crime. I use the 
youth property crime index, youth violent crime index and the respective categories that make up 
these two indices as the dependent variables for this estimated regression. Table 3.3 on page 31 
provides the descriptive statistics for the youth property crime index, youth violent crime index 
and the respective categories that make up these two indices. As the data set is a panel data set, I 
use panel estimation with fixed effects across the states, represented by αi, to estimate the 
regression. The form of this estimated regression is this. 
Crimeit =α + β1 State Minimum Wageit + β2 Police Expenditureit + β3 SNAP Recipientsit 
+β4College Attainmentit + ꞵ5 log(Beer Taxit )+ β6 Population Percent Maleit + β7Medicaid 








Descriptive Statistics for Types of Youth Crime 





Index of Violent 
Offenses 




Violent Offense 850 001.32 00.80 00.00 5.68 
Rape Violent Offense 850 002.30 01.09 00.00 10.54 
Robbery Violent Offense 850 012.39 08.05 00.08 44.65 
Aggravated Assault Violent Offense 850 029.93 17.51 03.67 104.65 
Property Crime 
Index of Property 
Offenses 
850 180.96 66.23 31.59 370.01 
Burglary Property Offense 850 029.88 15.50 02.71 99.96 
Larceny-Theft Property Offense 850 136.38 51.33 19.49 297.51 
Motor Vehicle Theft Property Offense 850 011.50 08.79 01.07 47.43 
Arson Property Offense 850 01.18 00.81 00.09 8.82 
Note. Figures represent youth arrest rate per 100,000 population. 
 Table 3.4 on page 33 lists all of the explanatory variables with their descriptions and 
hypothesized signs. The primary explanatory variable of interest in this model is State Minimum 
Wage. This variable represents whether a state uses the federal minimum wage or as set a higher 
minimum wage in a particular year. State Minimum Wage serves the purpose of measuring the 
direct impact of a state choosing to set their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. 
The frequency statistics for State Minimum Wage are shown in Table 3.5 on page 33 along with 
the frequency statistics for Medicaid Expansion and Marijuana Decriminalization. Medicaid 
Expansion represents whether a state has expanded Medicaid in any manner in a given year and 
Marijuana Decriminalization represents whether a state has chosen to decriminalize marijuana 
possession in a given year. These two variables constitute social welfare policy controls and are 




statistics of the other explanatory variables. Beer Tax, the dollar per gallon excise tax on beer in 
a state for a given year, is another social welfare policy variable and expected to have a negative 
sign for this reason. In the regression, the log of Beer Tax is used. SNAP Recipients, the number 
of SNAP recipients per 1,000 population in a given year, is a social welfare control as well as a 
proxy for poverty which is an important economic factor. Its sign is expected to be positive 
because it is a proxy for poverty. Population Percent Male, the proportion of a state’s population 
that is male in a given year, is an important demographic control. Males commit crimes at a 
higher rate than females so its sign is expected to be positive. College Attainment, the proportion 
of the population over age 25 with a bachelor degree or higher in a given year, controls for 
education as well as being a demographic control. Its sign is expected to be negative because 
education improves a person’s position in the labor market. Police Expenditures, the total per 
capita expenditure on police in a state in real 2017 dollars for a given year, controls for direct 
crime control measures. Its sign is uncertain since police expenditures can lead to reduced crime, 














State Minimum Wageit 
Dummy Variable = 1 if state set minimum wage above 
federal minimum wage in year t 
+/- 
Police Expenditureit 




SNAP Benefits Recipients per 1,000 population, state i 
in year t 
+ 
College Attainmentit 
Percent of population aged 25 and over with at least a 
bachelor degree, state i in year t 
- 
Beer Taxit Beer Excise Tax in dollars per gallon, state i in year t - 
Population Percent 
Maleit 




Dummy Variable = 1 if state expanded Medicaid in any 




Dummy Variable = 1 if state decriminalized Marijuana 




Frequency Statistics of Classification Explanatory Variables  
Variable N Value of 1 Value of 0 Percent=1 
State Minimum Wageit  850 298 552 35.06 
Medicaid Expansionit 850 108 742 12.71 








Descriptive Statistics of Non-Classification Explanatory Variables 




Police Expenditureit 850 048.30 26.70 05.00 183.00 
SNAP Recipientsit 850 107.23 44.69 28.91 225.78 
College Attainmentit 850 027.45 05.00 15.10 42.70 
Beer Taxit 850 000.29 00.26 40.02 1.29 
Population Percent Maleit 850 049.33 00.76 48.03 52.37 
 By applying this regression model to overall youth property crime and youth violent 
crime, I hope to determine whether the wage effect or unemployment effect is stronger for states 
who set their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. I then investigate the types of 
property crime and violent crime to see if the estimated effects on overall crime rates are due to 
certain types of property and violent crime and not others. One expectation of the estimation is 






Chapter 4: Results 
The estimated regression results of the panel regression model with fixed effects across 
states for the youth property crime index are provided in Table 4.1 on page 36, with Table 4.2 on 
page 40 providing the estimated results of the model for the individual categories of youth 
property crime. The estimation results of the youth violent crime index are provided in Table 4.3 
on page 43 and Table 4.4 on page 46 provides the estimated results of the model for the 
individual categories of youth violent crime. 
 The estimated model in Table 4.1 has the Youth Property Crime Index as the dependent 
variable. State Minimum Wage controls for youth wage in the model. The additional seven 
explanatory variables act as controls for factors that are important when discussing crime. Beer 
Tax, Medicaid Expansion and Marijuana Decriminalization represent social welfare policies 
known to impact criminal activity. It is important to note that the log of Beer Tax is used for the 
sake of interpretation. SNAP Recipients also represents a social welfare policy, but additionally 
acts as a proxy for poverty. Police Expenditures represents a crime control measure. College 
Attainment and Population Percent Male measure key demographic factors. This model explains 
about 69 percent of the total variation in the Youth Property Crime Index. The F-statistic for this 
estimated regression is 12.34 indicating the model is overall statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. The F-statistic for fixed effects is 30.37 which means I reject the null hypothesis that fixed 
effects are jointly equal to zero at the 0.01 level. The F-statistic for jointly testing whether the 
estimated coefficients are equal to zero after controlling for fixed effects is 16.43 so I reject the 





































F (Overall) 12.34*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 30.37*** 
F (βs) 16.43*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 This study attempts to test alternative hypotheses with regard to the effect of states setting 




indicates that the unemployment effect is stronger. This effect occurs due to wage loss from 
diminished labor demand by firms. If the estimated effect is negative, it indicates that the wage 
effect is stronger. The variable that measures this effect is State Minimum Wage which classifies 
states by whether they use the federal minimum wage or have set a higher minimum wage. This 
effect occurs due to wage growth from the rising wage floor in the labor supply and demand 
model. The estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage is -11.605, and is significantly 
different than zero at the 0.05 level. The effect of a state setting their minimum wage above the 
federal minimum wage is an 11.605 decrease in youth property crime incidences per year per 
100,000 population, controlling for other factors. That equates to about six percent fewer 
incidences than the mean incidence of youth property crime for the period and states represented 
in this study. The negative sign on the estimated coefficient implies there is a negative 
relationship between youth property crime and the minimum wage rate, which indicates that the 
wage effect is stronger than the unemployment effect. 
 All of the estimated coefficients on the other explanatory variables are significantly 
different than zero at the 0.01 or 0.05 level except for Marijuana Decriminalization. The 
estimated coefficient on Medicaid Expansion is -19.863, and is significantly different than zero 
at the 0.01 level. This means that states who have expanded Medicaid in some fashion 
experience 19.863 less youth property crime incidences per year per 100,000 population than 
states who have not expanded Medicaid in some fashion, controlling for other factors. The 
direction of this effect is expected because expanding Medicaid improves the population’s 
economic standing. The estimated coefficient on Police Expenditure is -0.380, and is 




spending on police reduces the incidence of youth property crimes per year per 100,000 
population by 0.380. Since police act to directly mitigate crime, the direction of this estimate 
suggests this variable captures the effect of police on crime more than the effect of crime on 
police expenditures. The estimated coefficient on College Attainment is -7.370, and is significant 
at the 0.01 level. This means that one more percent of the over 25 population having attained at 
least a bachelor’s degree reduces youth property crime by 7.370 incidences per year per 100,000 
population, controlling for other factors. Education is known to mitigate crime rates, so the 
direction of this effect is as expected. The estimated coefficient on Beer Tax is -21.698, and is 
significantly different than zero at the 0.05 level. This means that a one percent increase in the 
dollar per gallon beer excise tax reduces youth property crime by 21.698 incidences per year per 
100,000 population, controlling for other factors. Alcohol is often a factor in crimes, so the 
direction of this effect is as expected. The estimated coefficient on SNAP Recipients is 0.238, 
and is significantly different than zero at the 0.01 level. This means that one more SNAP 
recipient per 1,000 population leads to 0.238 more youth property crimes per year per 100,000 
population, controlling for other factors. The direction of this effect is expected because SNAP is 
a proxy for poverty which is known to have a positive relationship with crime rates. The 
estimated coefficient on Population Percent Male is 56.146, and is significantly different than 
zero at the 0.01 level. This means that a one percentage point increase of males in the total 
population will lead to a 56.146 increase in youth property crimes per year per 100,000 
population, controlling for other factors. Males are known to commit crimes at a much higher 




 I estimate the effect of minimum wage for each type of property crime. In Table 4.2 the 
estimated regression results for each of the four categories of property crime are shown. This 
model explains 78 percent of the total variation in Youth Burglary, 70 percent of the total 
variation in Youth Larceny-Theft, 71 percent of the total variation in Youth Motor Vehicle Theft, 
and 42 percent of the total variation in Youth Arson. The overall F-statistic for Youth Burglary is 
24.18, for Youth Larceny-Theft it is 14.01, for Youth Motor Vehicle Theft it is 28.18 and for 
Youth Arson it is 12.66 indicating all four models are overall significant at the 0.01 level. The 
respective F-statistics for fixed effects are 43.52, 31.65, 28.11 and 8.86 meaning I reject the null 
that fixed effects are jointly equal to zero at the 0.01 level for all four models. The F-statistics for 
jointly testing whether the estimated coefficients are equal to zero after controlling for fixed 
effects for the four models respectively are 33.09, 17.26, 71.49 and 10.75 meaning I reject the 













Fixed Effects Regression Results for the Types of Youth Property Crime 



























































































R-squared 0.780 0.702 0.712 0.424 
N 850.000 850.000 850.000 850.00000 
States 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.0000 
Years 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.0000 
F (Overall) 24.18*** 14.01*** 28.18*** 12.66*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 43.52*** 31.65*** 28.11*** 8.86*** 
F (βs) 33.09*** 17.26*** 71.49*** 10.75*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 The estimated effect of State Minimum Wage is significant at the 0.10 level or better for 




estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage is -2.188 when modeling Youth Burglary, and the 
estimate is significantly different than zero at the 0.05 level. The estimated coefficient on State 
Minimum Wage is -7.600 when modeling Youth Larceny-Theft, and is significantly different 
than zero at the 0.05 level. The estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage is -2.139 when 
modeling Youth Motor Vehicle Theft, and is statistically different than zero at the 0.01 level. 
The estimated coefficient for State Minimum Wage is 0.136 when modeling Youth Arson, and is 
significantly different than zero at the 0.10 level. As with the overall Youth Property Crime 
Index, the wage effect is stronger than the unemployment effect for Youth Burglary, Youth 
Larceny-Theft and Youth Motor Vehicle Theft. The positive relationship between State 
Minimum Wage and Youth Arson suggests that the unemployment effect is stronger than the 
wage effect for this category of crime. 
 The estimated effects of the other explanatory variables vary some from the regression 
model being applied to overall youth property crime. Several estimated coefficients that were 
significantly different from zero when modeling overall youth property crime are not 
significantly different from zero when modeling individual property crime categories. In the 
estimated model for Youth Burglary, the estimated coefficient of SNAP Recipients is not 
significantly different than zero. In the estimated model for Youth Larceny-Theft, the estimated 
coefficient of Police Expenditures is not significantly different than zero. In the estimated model 
for Youth Motor Vehicle Theft, the estimated coefficients of Medicaid Expansion and Beer Tax 
were not significantly different than zero. In the estimated model for Youth Arson, the estimated 
coefficients of Police Expenditure and Beer Tax were not significantly different than zero. Most 




but not all relationships held. The estimated coefficient for SNAP Recipients is negative in the 
Youth Motor Vehicle Theft model and in the Youth Arson model when it was positive when 
modeling overall youth property crime. This difference in relationship is not expected. 
 Table 4.3 is the estimated results of the model applied to the Youth Violent Crime Index.  
This model explains over 79 percent of the total variance in the Youth Violent Crime Index. The 
F-statistic for this estimated regression is 14.78 indicating the model is overall statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The F-statistic for fixed effects is 52.91 meaning I reject the null 
hypothesis that fixed effects are jointly equal to zero at the 0.01 level. The F-statistic for jointly 
testing whether the estimated coefficients are equal to zero after controlling for fixed effects is 














































F (Overall) 14.78*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 52.91*** 
F (βs) 6.80*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 If there is an effect on youth crime from states choosing to set their minimum wage above 




crime than it is for youth violent crime. Economic factors are expected to have less influence on 
violent crime rates. To determine which type of crime is more affected by minimum wage I 
compare the estimated coefficient results of State Minimum Wage in Table 4.1 to the results in 
Table 4.3. In Table 4.3 the estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage is 1.559 when 
modeling youth violent crime, but this estimated coefficient is not significantly different than 
zero. This finding indicates that minimum wage has no effect on the Youth Violent Crime Index. 
The estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage when modeling youth property crime in 
Table 4.1 is -11.605 and significantly different than zero at the 0.05 level. These results show 
that minimum wage has a greater effect on youth property crime than it does on youth violent 
crime. 
 Only four of the other explanatory variables have estimated coefficients that show to be 
significantly different than zero at the 0.10 level or better when modeling the Youth Violent 
Crime Index. The estimated coefficient on Medicaid Expansion is -3.917, and is significantly 
different than zero at the 0.05 level. The estimated coefficient on College Attainment is -1.196, 
and is significantly different than zero at the 0.01 level. Both of these variables display a 
negative relationship to youth violent crime as expected. The estimated coefficient on Population 
Percent Male is 10.153, and is significantly different than zero at the 0.01 level. This positive 
relationship to youth violent crime is expected. The estimated coefficient on Beer Tax is 7.177, 
and is significantly different than zero at the 0.01 level. Although this result suggests that a one 
percentage point increase in the beer excise tax leads to 7.177 more incidences per year per 
100,000 population of violent crime, the direction of this effect is unexpected. As seen in Table 




 Table 4.4 shows the estimated results of this model for each of the four categories of 
violent crime. This model explains about 76 percent of the total variation in Youth Murder and 
Non-Negligent Manslaughter, 67 percent of the total variation in Youth Rape, 82 percent of the 
variation in Youth Robbery, and 83 percent of the variation in Youth Aggravated Assault. The 
overall F-statistic for Youth Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter is 20.08, for Youth Rape 
it is 30.22, for Youth Robbery it is 15.01 and for Youth Aggravated Assault it is 17.70 indicating 
all four models are overall significant at the 0.01 level. The respective F-statistics for fixed 
effects are 41.38, 21.97, 63.51 and 65.76 meaning I reject the null that fixed effects are equal to 
zero at the 0.01 level for all four models. The F-statistics for jointly testing whether the estimated 
coefficients are equal to zero after controlling for fixed effects for the four models respectively 
are 15.24, 31.79, 5.86 and 16.88 meaning I reject the null hypothesis that the estimated 












Fixed Effects Regression Results for Types of Youth Violent Crime 
 
Youth Murder and 
Non-Negligent 
Manslaughter 



























































































R-squared 0.764 0.671 0.823 0.831 
N 850.00000 850.0000 850.00000 850.000 
States 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.00 
Years 17.000 17.000 17.000 17.00 
F (Overall) 20.08*** 30.22*** 15.01*** 17.70*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 41.38*** 21.97*** 63.51*** 65.76*** 
F (βs) 15.24*** 31.79*** 5.86*** 16.88*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 




 Looking at the estimated coefficient results for State Minimum Wage in Table 4.4, I see 
that three of the individual categories of youth violent crime display similar results to overall 
youth violent crime. The estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage for Youth Murder and 
Non-Negligent Manslaughter is -0.002, and it is not significantly different than zero. The 
estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage for Youth Rape is 0.093, but it is not significantly 
different than zero. The estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage for Youth Aggravated 
Assault is 0.723, but it is not significantly different than zero. For these three categories the 
findings indicate that minimum wage has no effect, which is the same as I found with the Youth 
Violent Crime Index. Economic factors are expected to influence robbery, as this crime does 
have an economic component. The estimated coefficient on State Minimum Wage for Youth 
Robbery is 0.770, and is significantly different than zero at the 0.10 level. So unlike with overall 
youth violent crime, minimum wage does show to have an effect on youth robbery. This positive 
relationship between State Minimum Wage and Youth Robbery shows that the unemployment 
effect is stronger than the wage effect for this category of crime. 
The estimated effects of the other explanatory variables vary for the four categories of 
violent crime from the estimated results of overall violent crime. The estimated coefficient on 
Medicaid Expansion when modeling Youth Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter does not 
show to be significantly different than zero. This is different than what was found with overall 
youth violent crime. The estimated coefficient on Medicaid Expansion for Youth Rape is 0.171, 
and is significantly different than zero at the 0.10 level. This is an unexpected result. The 
estimated coefficient on Marijuana Decriminalization for Youth Rape is -0.379, and is 




estimated coefficient for Police Expenditure is significantly different than zero at the 0.05 level 
for Youth Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter and Youth Rape. This varies from the 
overall youth violent crime. The estimated coefficient on SNAP Recipients did not show to be 
significantly different than zero at the 0.10 level or higher for overall youth violent crime, but 
does for the four categories. SNAP Recipients displays a negative relationship with Youth 
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter, Youth Rape and Youth Aggravated Assault. This 
negative relationship is not expected. The estimated effect is positive for Youth Robbery and the 
opposing effects in these models lead to the effect on overall violent crime being insignificant in 
Table 4.3. The estimated coefficient on College Attainment for Youth Murder and Non-
Negligent Manslaughter does not show to be significantly different than zero, which varies from 
what was found with overall youth violent crime. The estimated coefficient on Beer Tax was not 
significantly different than zero for Youth Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter, Youth 
Rape and Youth Robbery. These display results that differ from overall youth violent crime. The 
estimated coefficient on Beer Tax for Youth Aggravated Assault is 6.067, and is significant at 
the 0.01 level. This result is similar to what is seen in the overall youth violent crime model, but 
the positive relationship displayed is not expected. 
 For crimes with economic components, minimum wage has some effect. States who set 
their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage see some change in the rate of these 
crimes. The wage effect is stronger than the unemployment effect for the Youth Property Crime 
Index, Youth Burglary, Youth Larceny-Theft and Youth Motor Vehicle Theft. States who set 
their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage show decreases in these categories of 




Robbery. States who set their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage show increases 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 There is extensive discussion regarding the minimum wage rate in the United States, with 
many states and cities passing increases that phase in over the course of several years. The goal 
of these increases is to improve the situation for young and unskilled workers in the labor force. 
These increases will have an impact on crime rates. This study examines what impact minimum 
wage has on crime by estimating youth crime rates using panel estimation with fixed effects 
across the 50 states over a 17-year period. 
Overall property crime and three of its categories display a negative relationship with 
minimum wage. States that choose to set their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage 
experience decreases in incidences of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and overall 
property crime. For these categories of crime, the wage effect is stronger than the unemployment 
effect. One category of property crime and one category of violent crime show a positive 
relationship with minimum wage. When states choose to set their minimum wage above the 
federal minimum wage, they experience an increase in incidences of arson and robbery. For 
these categories of crime, the unemployment effect is stronger than the wage effect. Minimum 
wage did not show any impact on overall violent crime, murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 
rape and aggravated assault. 
 In terms of future research, it might be prudent to use county level data rather than state 
level. Crime is a more localized phenomenon and crime rates vary greatly based on the region 
being discussed. By using counties, it should be possible to better account for the effect of 




that many cities and counties have chosen to set their minimum wages above the states minimum 
wage. 
 The goal of this paper is to directly measure the effect that minimum wage has on crime 
rates. Since the federal government has chosen to not raise the minimum wage in a number of 
years, many states are choosing to raise their minimum wages on their own. This phenomenon 
has implications for crime rates and it is important that states understand what happens when 
they set their minimum wages above the federal minimum wage. Property crime will decrease, 
but this is not a complete picture. There are specific categories of crime that will increase when 
states set their minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. Policy makers should take note 
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Descriptive Statistics for the Other Types of Crime 




Total Crime 850 1335.68 529.40 162.15 6699.72 
Other Assaults 850 112.71 4.93 18.76 306.33 
Forgery and Counterfeiting 850 7.55 4.93 0.07 33.40 
Fraud 850 17.98 20.34 0.34 210.48 
Embezzlement 850 2.40 2.63 0.00 16.33 
Buying, Receiving and 
Possessing Stolen Property 
850 11.43 8.31 0.00 47.83 
Vandalism 850 32.01 17.18 4.87 98.99 
Carrying or Possessing a 
Weapon 
850 16.39 8.83 0.63 54.06 
Prostitution and Criminalized 
Vice 
850 4.00 6.12 0.00 57.07 
Other Sex Offenses 850 5.07 3.32 0.14 20.66 
Drug Abuse Violations 850 166.67 71.49 19.40 438.35 
Gambling 850 0.82 1.62 0.00 16.26 
Offenses Against Family and 
Children 
833 7.12 6.37 0.10 42.43 
DUI 833 105.23 52.72 5.82 367.88 
Liquor Law Violations 850 147.13 139.95 0.81 967.77 
Drunkenness 833 28.15 40.01 0.00 196.40 
Disorderly Conduct 833 67.64 54.49 3.04 523.90 
Vagrancy 833 2.07 4.42 0.00 38.50 
All Other Offenses 850 358.51 255.41 16.96 5240.11 
Suspicion 833 0.42 1.54 0.00 26.35 
Curfew Violations 833 12.58 17.70 0.00 117.04 
Runaways 490 15.90 20.32 0.00 139.38 






































F (Overall) 41.15*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 17.81*** 
F (βs) 28.23*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 







































F (Overall) 24.75*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 37.71*** 
F (βs) 21.56*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 32.71*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 23.00*** 
F (βs) 73.72*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 36.14*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 16.13*** 
F (βs) 23.47*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 19.37*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 70.91*** 
F (βs) 21.40*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 21.89*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 39.95*** 
F (βs) 26.00*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 41.23*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 47.11*** 
F (βs) 39.60*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 13.12*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 55.66*** 
F (βs) 40.47*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 13.43*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 84.56*** 
F (βs) 9.32*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 35.02*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 43.41*** 
F (βs) 36.44*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 9.38*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 39.37*** 
F (βs) 17.23*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 11.14*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 39.07*** 
F (βs) 11.30*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 10.57*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 43.55*** 
F (βs) 16.43*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 74.47*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 17.20*** 
F (βs) 22.18*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 72.13*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 39.52*** 
F (βs) 38.92*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 21.83*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 92.32*** 
F (βs) 6.39*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 17.11*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 67.69*** 
F (βs) 26.99*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 8.18*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 33.90*** 
F (βs) 6.78*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 11.48*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 13.30*** 
F (βs) 6.75*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 







































F (Overall) 8.28*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 5.57*** 
F (βs) 5.20*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 43.16*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 37.62*** 
F (βs) 27.16*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





































F (Overall) 39.30*** 
F (Fixed Effects) 53.65*** 
F (βs) 3.86*** 
Note. Estimated state fixed effects are not included in table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
